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Introduction
Of all the fascinating concepts that exist in the field of comparative politics, there are few
that have as resounding of an impact as that of democracy. Even before the days of the
American and French revolutions, influential figures have debated the merits of democracy as a
form of governance. While the early conceptions of democracy were dismissed by early
philosophers as “mob rule” and oppression by the majority, democracy has since gained
widespread acceptance. Today, the idea of democracy has gained so much popularity that states
who are arguably non-democratic insist on labeling themselves as democracies in their official
titles. Western democratic politicians extol the values of democracy and offer the spread of
democracy throughout the world as a means to create peace and development. The findings of
democratic peace theory and several economic development theories lend credence to these
politicians’ claims.
With the emergence of the Bush Doctrine, democratic regime change became an
important component of that administration’s foreign relations policy goals. However, one can
easily argue that states can “change” to democracies in name only. In order to truly achieve the
effects that result from democratic peace, states that interact with each other must both have high
levels of democracy in action, not solely in institutional definition. If the spread of democracy is
indeed important for the spread of peace and development throughout the world, we must
attempt to understand what causes development of democratic practices.
Several theories have been created in order to explain democratic development. These
theories cover a wide range of ideas that include economic explanations (Lipset 1959,
Przeworski et al. 2000) and cultural explanations (Almond and Verba 1965, Inglehart and Welzel
2003). However, these theories often lack a solid causal mechanism for the emergence of
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democracies. Economic based theories, such as modernization theory appeared to have a clear
causal mechanism for the emergence of democracy. However, later studies have emerged to
counter this claim finding that economic development helped democracies to survive but did not
improve odds of democratic emergence (Przeworski et al 2000).
Given that separate economic and cultural explanations have not completely borne out, a
model that incorporates both the economic and cultural determinants must be used in order to
find the cause for greater levels of democracy. Using cultural modernization theory as the
foundation, this thesis will argue that both economic and cultural determinants must be
considered simultaneously. Socioeconomic development in and of itself is a necessary condition
for democratic development, but not a sufficient condition. Socioeconomic development should
lead to changes in the values of the people within a state. Because the quality of life has
improved for the average person within a state that is developing economically, these changes in
the values of the people within the state should lead to changes in the level of democracy in that
state, as they no longer need to focus their attention on matters of survival. As economies
development and values move more towards democratic values, the level of democracy of a state
should become higher.
What follows in the next chapter will be a thorough discussion of the literature of
democratic development. Because the literature of democratic development is so expansive, this
thesis will focus on what is often known as modernization theory. In the discussion of
modernization theory, the inference on the importance of culture will also be discussed. Along
with these components of modernization theory, a review of the literature that asserts the
importance of culture’s influence on democratic development will be made.
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From there, this thesis will move on to discuss how this author believes the literature on
democratic development can be improved and show the results of the models tested using this
line of thought. Chapter 2 will introduce a way of determining whether economic development
and culture can be simultaneously influencing democratic development. The interactive model
of modernization theory will be discussed there. Chapter 3 will then discuss the data used and
the methodology employed to create this interactive framework of modernization theory.
Chapter 4 will focus on the analysis of the models used test the interactive framework
and will discuss what the implications of the outcomes are. The findings of this chapter add
further support for the notion that economic development is good for democratic development.
However, the findings also suggest that culture may not have as strong an influence on
democratic development as many scholars had thought. This thesis will end with a summary of
the outcome and suggest why the results are the way are and how future scholars or policy
makers can use these results as a guide to for action.
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Chapter 1: A Look at Democratic Development
Economic and cultural explanations for the varying levels of democracy throughout the
world have surfaced as two major research points for comparativists. This is not surprising
considering that many other theories in the field of political science lend credence to the
important role of both economic motivation and personal values. However, the problem with
separating these two factors is not the fact that they fail to explain the phenomenon of
democracy, but it is in the fact that they fail to explain the phenomenon in a wholly satisfying
manner. That is, while each field has generated interesting findings about levels of democracy,
the separate fields have only explained bits and pieces of the phenomenon. This thesis argues
that the reason for this is that economic and cultural determinants cannot be separated when
discussing the level of a democracy in a state.
1.1 Economic Focus
There has been a great deal of work on what has been labeled as “modernization theory.”
This economic theory of democratic emergence, as well as theories that branch out from the core
theory, is most often attributed to Seymour Martin Lipset (1959). This theory argues that
societies go through a progression of economic development where at a certain point a new form
of government needs to be instituted in order to effectively run society. All societies start as
immature, traditional societies, but as they become wealthier, they evolve into mature, modern
societies. Once they have become modern, a new form of government, democracy, is needed as
dictatorships are no longer sustainable in this environment as they lose control of their
effectiveness thanks to access to more advanced technologies for the average citizen.
The structural argument for why democratic development is so high in a wealthy country
mainly revolves around the expansion of the middle class. As a society becomes wealthy, a
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growing segment of the population will then have access to the resources needed in order to
attain higher education, thus creating a more intellectually sophisticated population. Along with
education levels rising in society, a developing society will also see increasing access to
information. That is, individuals in developing societies will be able to have more access to
news thanks to the wealth attained in a country that can go to purchasing radios and televisions.
For the wealthiest of countries, individuals now have access to news, and now through the World
Wide Web (Lipset 1959, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992).
All of this culminates in a growing middle class that is knowledgeable about their
environment, which place demands on the regime of the state in order to gain more access to
resources. For some scholars, like Edward N. Muller, this means that the level of economic
inequality plays a vital role in the emergence and development of a democracy (1995). Muller
argues that the presence of economic inequality shows the absence of a large middle class and
that this inequality is an unhealthy environment for the development of democracy. Muller
states, “If redistributive policies are blocked in the legislature or are not even proposed, then the
subordinate classes in the legitimacy of the democratic process will be eroded” (1995, 968). He
then goes on to argue that these segments of society will just as likely turn to an authoritarian
regime to rule society.
Scholars (Lipset 1959, Przeworski, et al. 2000) have pointed out that this framework
suggests that on top of wealthy countries having higher levels of democracy, wealthy
democracies are also more likely to survive and sustain high democracy levels. However, this
implication is not necessarily true. Przeworski, et al. finds that wealth has no determining factor
on when democracies emerge and how they develop (2000). The authors use Latin America as
an example of a region that experimented with democracy in conditions that are not conducive to
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the development of democracy. The region, as a whole, was underdeveloped and many Latin
American countries experienced a high level of political instability as dictatorships were
continuously overthrown, often replaced by democracies. Wealth, in these cases, was not a
major factor in the emergence of the new democratic regimes that often followed the fall of
dictators. This example, as well as their statistical models, point to a problem with the initial
framework of modernization theory, which assumes that there is only one reason and mechanism
for the emergence of democracies, economic development (Munck 1994, 361). Przeworski, et
al. continue this line of thought by arguing that many European countries and Argentina are
examples of states where democracy emerged as a result of, not economic development, but war
(2000, 89) or the death of a dictator (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 158).
Przeworski, et al. do however, find that there is a high correlation between a regime’s
wealth and its likelihood of survival. That is, the greater wealth that a state has, the more likely
that the regime in power will continue to rule. While, at first glance, this finding may seem like
validation for the “survival” portion of modernization theory, it turns out to be a double-edged
sword that also inflicts some damage to the theory. The authors determined that the probability
that dictatorships survive, along with democracies, increase once the country reaches a certain
level of wealth, $7000 GDP per capita. The authors’ models show that dictatorships do indeed
grow more unstable as wealth in the country accumulates. However, once this threshold is met,
dictatorship survivability grows. This seems to be precisely what is occurring in quickly
developing nations like Russia, China, and Singapore. As Przeworski, et al. assert, “with 25
dictatorships surviving in wealthy countries and 36 falling in poor ones, the causal power of
development in generating democracies cannot be very strong” (2000, 94).
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This seems to be precisely what is occurring in quickly developing nations like Russia,
China, and Singapore. These examples can be cited as evidence that some alterations need to be
made to the basic form of modernization theory. It has been argued in a case study of Russian
political development that the Russian state has developed into an “illiberal” regime, rather than
an authoritarian regime (Robinson 2000). The reason for this stems from the fact that the state is
not strong enough to collect taxes from each individual in the society. Unlike Western capitalist
states, whose governments were able to evolve along with the international market, “late
developing states are often illiberal, if not authoritarian, because they have to compensate for
their weaknesses as economic managers” (2000, 1393).
However, according to World Bank economic indicators, the Russian market has
continually grown from 1999-2005 (World Bank 2010). It seems unlikely that such impressive
growth can be attributed to a state that has so little control over its national market. This leads us
back to modifying modernization theory to account for why late, quickly developing states are
often not turning the page towards democracy. To address this problem, a conditional hypothesis
has been generated to answer the issue of stability of regimes at high levels of economic
development, regardless of regime type. By creating a conditional model, Ryan Kennedy was
able to show that high levels of economic development is a stabilizing factor for regime, but if
any major institutional change occurs, the change will likely be to a democratic regime (2010).
Modernization theory’s inability to fully explain democratic emergence and higher levels
of democracy can be attributed to the fact that it lacks an important component, culture.
Institutions cannot be effective if those who live under its authority do not have the beliefs and
values that would support the governing system. Lipset himself admits the importance of values
in the formation of a democracy; “If a political system is not characterized by a value system
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allowing for the peaceful ‘play’ of power – the adherence by the ‘outs’ to decisions made by the
‘ins’ and the recognition of the ‘ins’ of the rights of the ‘outs’ – there can be no stable
democracy” (1959, 71). While inserting the term “value”, Lipset completely disregards this
nuance of his definition. This is the result of the absence of culture as a key variable for why
modernization theory has not held true. It is now time to contrast economic theories of
democracy with cultural theories of democracy.
1.2 Cultural Focus
Whenever bringing up the concept of culture as a causal factor, we must look at the
constructivist theories that have developed from this line of thought. Constructivists argue that
cultures can be molded and not given natural states. As stated by Clark, Golder, and Golder,
“Cultures can change in response to social, economic, and political actors” (2009, 212). This is
in direct contrast to primordialists who believe that cultures cannot be changed and are fixed to
what they are, no matter what influences surround it. If primordialists are correct, some cultures
are inherently incompatible with democratic governance. Democratic governments of the world
must be willing to accept this fact and refrain from attempting to spread democracies
internationally, whether they believe it is the ideal form of government or not. However, if
constructivists are correct, then it is more than possible that democracies can be established and
maintained in areas of the world that have not experienced democracy.
Key to this constructivist idea is the work of Alexander Wendt (1992). In an attempt to
account for the limiting scope of realism, which argues that state interests run in the direction of
establishing self-security causing a global atmosphere of conflict, Wendt posits that states learn
this type of behavior based on the previous experiences and interactions with other states (1992).
States do not necessarily have to live in a “self-help” world. Through multiple cooperative
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interactions, states can learn cooperative behavior and create cooperative identities and interests.
We can take this key concept of interaction leading to identity and conforming behavior to the
plane of government establishment. If continuous iterations of cooperation lead to the creation
of a conforming identity within a society, that society will then have a framework for structure of
governance.
Putnam makes this correlation in Making Democracy Work (1993). In his study of local
Italian governments, he finds that the governments located in the northern regions of Italy were
generally more likely to have success in implementing and maintaining democratic processes and
government effectiveness than their southern counterparts (1993). Putnam found that these local
governments had similar institutional structures but varied in their effectiveness. Putnam
determines that the northern regions had a higher level of civic culture than the southern regions
due to their early experiences with republican governance. Essentially, civic culture is an
intervening variable, while democratic history is what leads to democratic success.
Addressing the concept of “civic culture” will be important in regards to further
discussion of cultural effects on democracy. Almond and Verba state that only culture provides
the “psychological basis of democratization” (1965, 9) and that without this specific psychology,
the odds for democratic sustainability are slim (Clarke, Golder, and Golder 2009, 212). This
democratic mindset involves high levels of interpersonal trust, preference for gradual social
change, high level of support for the existing political system, and high levels of life satisfaction.
These are some of the variables that are used in studies that support Putnam’s arguments (Muller
and Seligson, 1994). Other scholars, stemming from the works of Montesquieu (1989 [1748])
have found that enlistment in associations and other social groups help to nurture these values,
and therefore are beneficial to democratic development (Paxton, 2002; Putnam 2000).
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Samuel P. Huntington has famously argued the importance of culture in his works (1991,
1996). The author posits that one of the reasons for “the third wave” of democracy was the
Catholic Church’s reformation of values. He argues, along the line of Max Weber (1905) that
Protestant values of individuals and individual responsibility were greatly in line with values that
are in sync with the idea of democracy. Given this fact, it would only be natural for changes in
the Catholic Church’s interpretation of values to lead to the emergence of democracies in Latin
America and Eastern Europe (1991). A similar argument is made by other scholars (Lipset 1963,
Silvert 1967, Lambert 1967, Trentmann 1988, De Jong et al., 2006, Kwok and Tandesse 2006),
in regards to culture’s effect on economic development. In the context of Modernization theory
and democratic development, economic development is an intervening variable on democratic
development.
1.3 Pitfalls of the Cultural Argument
However, these cultural studies are not without fault. While Putnam’s comparative study
of northern and southern Italy reveals that cultural values were very important to establishing
effective democratic governments, as Hyeong-Ki Kwon (2004) points out, Northern Italy’s
strong support for Mussolini’s Fascism is counter-intuitive to his Putnam’s findings. The
findings of Huntington’s The Third Wave can be dismissed simply by understanding which
countries existed and did not exist by 1950. Of the countries that were independent by this time,
only those in Latin America showed instability in regime types, while countries from outside the
region generally exhibited stability (Przeworski et al 2000, 40). All the while, new countries
became independent and these new countries tended to be authoritarian. As Przeworski and
Limongi state, “the proportion of democracies among these “new” countries grew slightly with
no waves rolling down or up. In turn, the decline of the aggregate proportion of democracies in
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the world during the 1960s is largely due to the emergence of new countries rather than the
transformation of old ones (1997, 171).”
There is also the question of whether democracy causes changes in political culture or if
changes in culture develop the emergence of democracy. This argument is a temporal one in
which “the chicken and the egg” question is evident. Muller and Seligson argue that Almond
and Verba (1965) and Inglehart (1988, 1990) do not have the correct temporal order in their
models of effect on democracy. Muller and Seligson argue, “the problem is that the possibility
of an effect of years of continuous democracy on civic culture attitudes is ignored (1994, 636).
These authors go on to find that most civic culture attitudes do not have major impact
changing levels of democracy. The only attitude the authors list as having a significant impact is
the “support for gradual reform”. They also find that democracy actually has more of a
significant impact on attitudes pertaining to interpersonal trust. This finding correlates with the
idea that democratic experience is what causes cultural change (1994). Seligson goes on to
conduct his own study of how individual values affect democracy in an attempt to invalidate
Inglehart and Welzel’s results (2002). After making several changes to the methodology used by
Inglehart and Welzel, Seligson takes a completely different reading of the findings and believes
that Inglehart and Welzel has overstated the relation between individual values and democracy.
Inglehart and Welzel address all of these issues of methodology and modernization
theory in Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy (2005). The authors first find a
significant relationship between economic development and changes in individual value, finding
that as states develop economically, there is a positive change in what they term “selfexpression” values. These self-expression values are important because they are the values
associated with democratic culture, similar to that of the civic culture described by Almond and
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Verba (1965). This addresses a simple assumption made by social capital scholars. Social
capital scholars never explain how individuals develop the type of democratic values that are
often encouraged by networking in associations, unions, and other social groups. It is simply
assumed that these individuals hold democratic values and these values are nurtured within their
social group (Paxton, 2002; Putnam 2000). According to Inglehart and Welzel, these individuals
have time on their hands to join these social groups and have developed a set of values based on
the fact that they are more financially secure. This will be discussed in more elaboration in the
next section. Inglehart and Welzel then find that these self-expression values are also related to
the democracy levels of a state. As self-expression values move in a positive direction,
democracy scores also improve (2005).
As can be seen from the works listed above, many pitfalls present themselves when
attempting to unearth why some countries exhibit high levels of democracy while other countries
have not.

A new perspective on democratic development must be taken in order to find a more

comprehensive answer to the puzzle of what causes high levels of democratic development.
Thus far, Inglehart and Welzel’s work (2005) has been the most encompassing as far as
capturing the cause for why democracies emerge and what factors are involved in their survival.
By combining the economic and cultural aspects of democratic development, Inglehart and
Welzel have created a logically sound model for how democracies emerge. This thesis will
continue this line of reasoning as illustrated in the chapter below.
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Chapter 2: Using Interaction Terms in Modernization Theory
Given the many problems that are associated with both the individual study of economic
or cultural effects on democracy, it is possible that using a more cultural modernization approach
would be more appropriate in explaining democratic development. By using a cultural
modernization approach to explaining the phenomenon, both socioeconomic development and
culture are involved simultaneously. Given the fact that Lipset and others describe the
modernization process as going from immature societies to mature societies, it is not out of line
to draw the conclusion that the attitudes of society change as they mature. Thus, it is possible
that economic development causes cultural changes in the society, which creates a call for
democratic reform. This is precisely what Inglehart and Welzel argue and what they attempt to
capture in their study (2005).
It is apparent that another factor during this developing phase of economic growth
facilitates democratic development. It is during this stage of development that many variants of
modernization theory claim socioeconomic changes occur, resulting in the downfall of
dictatorships and the emergence of democracies. The reason for this is the state is dependent on
the revenue that can be accumulated from its society, particularly the elites. The society will
allow for the state to collect revenue if they believe the current structure of governance is
suitable to their needs. Here we can see that there is a fundamental change in the attitude of the
society in regards to its relationship to the state. It is during this developing stage in which the
members of society realize and express their power vis-à-vis the state. Thus, a change in the
values and beliefs in society will create a demand on the state for a form of government that
meets the approval of its citizens. If the state refuses to acquiesce to these demands there is still
a risk to the stability of its regime because of the new values held by its citizens. The change in
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culture, created by socioeconomic development, creates the opportunity for democratic
development and the emergence of democratic regimes.

Economic Development

Cultural Change

Democratic Development

This thesis will use the basic foundations for modernization theory laid out by previous
scholars. As the flow chart above illustrates, culture is often thought of as an intervening
variable to democratic development. Inglehart and Welzel demonstrated that this by breaking
down the two segments of this flow chart and testing them separately, in order to determine the
two independent variables’ effect on democratic development.

Economic Development
Cultural Change

Cultural Change; THEN

Democratic Development

This thesis, along with testing the individual effects of economic development and
culture, will test the two variable’s effect on democratic development in conjunction with each
other and expect to find that while economic development is a necessary condition for
democratic development, it is insufficient by itself. Democratic values must exist within the
culture in order for a democracy to develop. In essence, the economic development and culture
interact with each other. To determine if this is true, this thesis will purpose two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Economic development within a state will lead to rise in levels of democracy.
Hypothesis 2: Economic development conditions changes in cultural values within a state that
lead higher levels of democracy.
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Chapter 3: Data and Methodology
In order to test these models, it is necessary to identify the key variables, being economic
development, cultural values, and levels of state democracy. Each will be measured with
specific databases already in existence. As stated above, modernization theory asserts that the
result of the economic development within a state allows the state to become more democratic.
Personal values are also changed as the wealth of the average citizen increases. First,
modernization theory will be tested in a similar manner to how Inglehart and Welzel test it. Both
economic development’s and personal value’s effects on the level of democracy of a state will be
tested. Then, it will be determined whether values condition economic development’s effect on
the level of democracy. In order to do this, variables must be identified.
3.1 Dependent Variable
A state’s level of democracy, the phenomenon of interest, is the dependent variable. This
will be measured using the 2010 Freedom House Freedom in the World dataset. Gauging the
effectiveness of legally backed institutions is important, but one can argue that institutional
definitions of democracy are not enough. Personal freedoms and civil liberties are also important
parts of democracy. These important elements are often missing in other datasets that measure
state levels of democracy, such as Polity IV, which focuses mainly on institutional democracy.
Inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Freedom House has included both the
institutional liberties and civil liberties for their Freedom in the World dataset (Freedom House
2010).
This dataset uses survey data from around the world to assess the level of political and
civil liberties within a state. Like Polity IV, Freedom House uses a scale to grade each state.
Democratic development is judged in two categories, political rights (PR) and civil liberties
(CL). Political rights scores are based off of electoral processes, political pluralism, and
15

functioning of government. Civil liberties scores are based off of freedom of expression and
belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, personal autonomy and individual
rights. A score of 1 ranks as the highest level of freedom and a score of 7 ranking as the lowest
level of freedom. For the purposes of this thesis, the civil liberties and political rights scores will
also be added together to create a third score to measure a state’s level of democracy. This total
score (FH) will have a score of 2 to indicate the highest possible level of democracy and a score
of 14 to indicate the lowest possible level of democracy. All three indicators (PR, CL, and FH)
will be used to assess the independent variables’ impact on democracy.
3.2 Independent Variables
World Values Survey (WVS) data will be used to measure the independent variable of
cultural values of individuals within a society. The WVS is a series of surveys of individuals
that are conducted in over eighty countries spanning from 1981-2005.1 The data are aggregated
and released at, approximately, five year intervals. By using this database, it is possible to
analyze the change of socio-cultural and political beliefs of the people in a state. Like Freedom
House, Inglehart and Welzel break down their cultural data into two categories: survival vs. selfexpression (from here on self-expression values) and traditional vs. secular-rational (from here
on secular values). In both self-expression and secular categories no observation has a score
lower than -2.0 (which indicates more survival oriented or traditional attitudes) or higher than 2.5
(which indicates more self-expression and secular attitudes).
In particular, Inglehart and Welzel bring attention to self-expression values as it is
strongly linked to higher levels of democracy. The authors state, “as external constraints on
human choice recede, people (and societies) place increasing emphasis on self-expression values
or individualism. This pattern is not culture-specific. It is universal” (2005, 138). This
1

Countries used for dataset will be provided in the Appendix.
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statement falls into a similar line of thought introduced by Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of
needs, which asserts that once a person has fulfilled a more fundamental need, they will be
motivated to fulfill higher level needs like esteem and self-actualization (1943, 1954). While
both categories will be used for the culture variable here, particular attention will also be placed
on the effects of self-expression values in accordance with the emphasis placed on it by Inglehart
and Welzel. We can then use these to understand its relation with economic development and its
relation with levels of democracy.2
The independent variable of economic development (GDPpcppp) will be measured using
the gross domestic product, purchasing power parity per capita. By using this value at any given
year, we are able to determine the relative wealth of the average individual within a state, helping
us to identify how wealthy a state and its people are.
In order to work these independent variables into the framework of the hypotheses in the
previous chapter, both the variables for culture and the variable for economic development will
be lagged by one year. This allows for analysis of the dependent variable, level of democracy,
given that it is affected by the independent variables prior to the observation year.3
In addition to the two separate independent variables, another variable will be used to
determine how much economic development and cultural values interact with one another. An
interaction term will be created by multiplying the GDPpcppp variable with each of the WVS
variables. By doing this, an assessment can be made on conditioning effects of culture on

2

Cultural Values for the Federal Republic of Germany will be taken from the WVS scores for West Germany. After
the unification of East and West Germany, WVS data continue to obtain data from the two regions separately.
3
Due to the restrictions of WVS data, lagging cultural values is only possible by inserting data for the year not
specifically captured by the release of WVS data. For instance, WVS contains data for the release years of 1990 and
1995, but not 1991-1994. In order to lag WVS data, the years 1991-1994 take the value of 1990 for the given
country.
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economic development. By combining GDPpcppp with both secular values and self-expression
values, the interactive terms GDP/Secular and GDP/Self-expression will be created.
3.3 Control Variables
In order to test the effects of other possible explanations for a state’s level of democracy,
control variables will be used. These control variables will be drawn for other theories that use
democracy as the dependent variable. The first of these control variables is a dummy variable
that takes into account whether a state’s colonial legacy helps to determine its level of
democracy. This allows for testing the importance of colonialism shaping culture and test the
idea that democracies of former British colonies are more likely to be successful based on the
fact that they were ruled over by what is considered to be a strong democracy (Horvath 1972)
Due to the perceived importance of ethnic fractionalization on democracy (Almond 1956,
Welch 1993, Fish and Kroenig 2006) this thesis will also use a variable to test this idea. The
variable for fractionalization will be the ethnic fractionalization variable calculated by Alesina et
al. (2003) to measure ethnic heterogeneity in a state. Values, range from 0 to 1. Lower scores
indicate greater homogeneity while higher scores indicate greater fractionalization. Additionally,
to test the idea that oil producing states and states that receive large amounts of foreign aid are
not likely to grow as democracies (Barro 1999, Ross 2001, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) the
2008 World Bank’s World Development Indicators will be used.
3.4 Models
Cross-sectional time series will be used to determine the relationship between
socioeconomic development, cultural values, and democracy. By applying this framework to
test this theory, this thesis hopes to find a thorough relation between economic development,
culture, and democratic development through the use of OLS regression. By testing the
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individual components of the Freedom House scores, along with the Freedom House score, and
the separate cultural scores, six tables have been created to show the results of these regression
analyses. Additionally, to test the basic model of modernization theory, Hypothesis 1, cultural
variables will be used as a control variable. By using all of the control variables mentioned
above in a single model, the number of observations was drastically reduced. In order to
minimize the reduction of observations, each control variable is tested individually with the
GDPpcppp and the culture variables. This results in having six models in each of the six tables.
Tables and models of note will be discussed and shown in the next chapter, while the others will
appear in the appendix.
The same approach will be taken to test the interactive theory of modernization, resulting
in six tables with six models in each. Both GDPpcppp and cultural variables will be used as
independent variables and combined to form an interactive term. These interactive terms will
show whether economic development and culture work in conjunction to develop democracies.
These values will illustrate the amount of that culture conditions GDPpcppp’s effect on
democratic development. Based on the stated variables and theory specifications above,
presented here are the models that will be used to test the previously proposed hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1
Level of Democracy = α + (b1) ln GDPpcppp (t-1) + (b2) Survival vs. Self-expression values (t-1)
or Traditional vs. Secular values(t-1) + (b3) Former British Colony + (b4) Ethnic
Fractionalization Alesina + (b5) Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports(t-1) + (b6) Aid Received
per Capita(t-1) + ε

19

Hypothesis 2
Level of Democracy = α + (b1) ln GDPpcppp (t-1) + (b2) Survival vs. Self-expression values (t-1)
or Traditional vs. Secular values(t-1) + (b3)[(ln GDPpcppp(t-1))*(Survival vs. Self-expression
values (t-1) or Traditional vs. Secular values(t-1))] + (b4) Former British Colony + (b5) Ethnic
Fractionalization Alesina + (b6) Fuel Export % of Merchandise Exports(t-1) + (b7) Aid Received
per Capita(t-1) + ε
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis
Because of the multiple variables this thesis uses to measure democratic development and
culture, there are several different combinations that can be used in order to test the interaction
model. In order to find out which variables affect democracy, models that show the effects on
FH scores were tested first. This is then followed by testing the effects of the variables on the
individual components of democracy, PR and CL. Testing begins by testing the merits of the
basic models of modernization theory.
4.1 Basic Modernization Analysis
Modernization theory contends that as a state develops economically, the level of
democracy within that state will improve. This is supported by the models tested in this thesis.
Table 1a displays the effects of the models that contain the secular values on a state’s total FH
scores. Note that a negative coefficient indicates development towards democracy as lower
democracy scores reflect greater levels of democracy. Table 2a displays the effects of the
models that contain the self-expression values. In each of the models, economic development
has a significant impact towards higher levels of democracy. These tables also show that a
state’s cultural level does not have a significant effect on democratic development. Neither the
secular value, nor the self-expression values had effect on the FH scores
The control variables, whether used individual alongside the economic and cultural
variables or in a single model, were largely insignificant. The only control variable to have any
significance was the percentage of fuel exports of a state’s merchandise exports. Tables 1a and
2a both show that the models that contained this variable supported the notion that increased
reliance on fuel exports is detrimental to democratic development.
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Table 1: Coefficients for Regression of Basic Modernization Model on Freedom House
scores using Traditional vs. Secular values
Independent
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

ln GDPpcppp

-2.74433**
(.334044)

-2.82762**
(.3383351)

-2.68885**
(.3606918)

-2.71602**
(.3854066)

-2.52444**
(.4996452)

-2.67170**
(.6825124)

Traditional vs.
Secular

.1792291
(.2784551)

.1013452
(.2710987)

.2532622
(.2837968)

.3290638
(.2839167)

.2991763
(.3997088)

.4580423
(.3894831)

Former British
Colony

-1.079727
(.7386226)

Ethnic
Fractional
Alesina

-.5677283
(.1.362224)

.7422373
(.9667905)

Fuel Export
% of
Merchandise
Exports

-1.419341
(.1.636282)

.029322*
(.0143582)

Aid Per Capita

.043404*
(.0165823)

-.0804332
(.0135249)

-.0121874
(.0141884)

R2

0.5622

0.5692

0.5635

0.5789

0.3336

0.3857

F<
Probability

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0009

# of Obs.

971

971

961

891

466

420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval.
Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Table 2: Coefficients for Regression of Basic Modernization Model on Freedom House
scores using Survival vs. Self-Expression values
Independent
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

ln GDPpcppp

-2.347033**
(.3219433)

-2.510891**
(.3531266)

-2.264376**
(.4068042)

-2.155014**
(.4010589)

-2.303374**
(.4223192)

-2.492681**
(.7387684)

Survival vs.
SelfExpression

-.3966424
(.2627662)

-.3225861
(.2599078)

-.4237147
(.2705365)

-.4828287
(.2538505)

-.3884845
(.4849527)

-.4075767
(.443151)

Former
British Colony

-.9710317
(.74484)

Ethnic
Fractional
Alesina

-.69740411
(1.355288)

.5143628
(.9909176)

Fuel Export
% of
Merchandise
Exports

-1.945472
(1.857713)

.0288909*
(.0128143)

Aid Per
Capita

.0400683*
(.0155141)

-.0211397
(.0129561)

-.0121393
(.0131595)

R2

0.5678

0.5735

0.5683

0.5822

0.3309

0.3750

F<
Probability

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0005

# of Obs.

971

971

961

891

466

420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Table 3: Coefficients for Basic Modernization Model on Civil Liberties using Survival vs.
Self-Expression values
Independent
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
ln GDPpcppp

-1.101396**
(.1326573)

-1.186598**
(.1446131)

-1.057225**
(.1678535)

-1.051279**
(.1701879)

-1.030393**
(.1679351)

-1.149677**
(.3011526)

Survival vs.
SelfExpression

-.2836692*
(.1160463)

-.2451617*
(.1547349)

-.2966303*
(.1189572)

-.3024672**
(.1112789)

-.2486523
(.2139806)

-.226897
(.2019752)

Former British
Colony

-.5049125
(.2963887)

Ethnic
Fractional
Alesina

-.3139524
(.5380394)

.2969027
(.4645905)

Fuel Export
% of
Merchandise
Exports

-.780232
(.7774912)

.0115314
(.0062384)

Aid Per
Capita

.0168049*
(.0074009)

-.0097275
(.0057671)

-.0051237
(.0056676)

R2

0.5963

0.6027

0.5977

0.6116

0.3362

0.3790

F<
Probability

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0005

# of Obs.

971

971

961

891

466

420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Most of the other tables that show the effects of the variables on the individual
components of democracy, PR and CL, produce the same outcome.4 In these tables only
GDPpcppp and the percentage of fuel exports had any significant effect on the level of political
rights and civil liberties. However, Table 2c did show that culture could have an effect on the
level of democracy in a state. Specifically, this table shows that self-expression values do have
an effect towards greater civil liberties within a state. Here, four of the six models show this
result. The two models where self-expression values are insignificant are the two models in
which the number of observations is reduced the most by the limited data available in the
models. This finding may support Inglehart and Welzel’s emphasis placed on self-expression
values (2005).

It is in the self-expression values that the authors placed questions that pertained

to interpersonal trust, tolerance towards other groups, and support for gender equality (2005, 54).
Perhaps, it is not surprising, then, that self-expression values lead to greater CL scores as the CL
component of FH focus more on the individual aspects of democracy rather than the institutional
aspects of democracy.
4.2 Interaction Model of Modernization
By using the interactive framework, it is possible to find any conditional effect that
variables may have on each other in relation to their overall effect on democratic development.
The models run here find that neither GDPpcppp nor the cultural values had any conditioning
effect on the other. That is, economic development did not condition culture, and more
importantly culture does not condition economic development. Thus, hypothesis 2 is not
supported.

4

Tables 1b, 1c, and 2b can be found in the Appendix.
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Table 4: Coefficients for Regression of Interactive Model on Freedom House using
Traditional vs. Secular values and Interactive Term GDP/Secular
Independent
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
-2.7145** -2.7959** -2.6658** -2.6593** -2.6144** -2.6539**
ln
(.3145573) (.3166781) (.3427277) (.3383723) (.5058248) (.5768234)
GDPpcppp
Traditional
vs. Secular

.4102853
.2931705
(.5388724) (.538504)

.4618422
(.5407273)

.8544673
(.5609556)

1.097742
(.7152512)

1.585739
(.6670355)

-.0000188 -.0000152 -.0000175
Interactive
GDP/Secular (.0000227) (.0000225) (.0000235)

-.0000383
(.0000245)

-.0001228
(.0000634)

-.0001678
(.0000682)

Former
British
Colony

-1.001576
(.7417739)

Ethnic
Fractional
Alesina

.0743421
(1.377729)

.6706792
(.9950364)

Fuel Export
% of
Merchandise
Exports

-1.93843
(1.706724)

.0344427*
(.0131634)

Aid Per
Capita

.046051**
(.0149819)

-.0190296
(.0129682)

-.0096089
(.0134353)

R2

0.5627

0.5686

0.5636

0.5904

0.3568

0.4272

F<
Probability

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

# of Obs.

967

967

957

891

462

420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.

Figure 1: Interaction Relation of Economic Development conditioning Traditional vs.
Secular values for Model 6 in Table 4 regarding Freedom House score
Figures 1 and 2 show that regardless of whether you are looking for the conditioning
effect of economic development on culture, or if you are looking for the conditioning effect of
culture on economic develop in regards to levels of democracy, you find that the effect is so
minimal, that they fail to register any visualization. This minuscule effect is present in every
model of every table generated with the interactive terms included in the model.5 Regardless of
the different combinations possible with the multiple variables to gauge a state’s democracy and
the multiple variable to display culture, this model has found that culture has, no more than a
minute conditioning effect on economic development, putting in to question the idea that culture
is an important variable on a state’s economic capacity. Neither does economic development
5

Because every graph displaying interactive effects displays the same lack of visualization, the other graphs will not
be included in this thesis.
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have a conditioning effect on culture, which conflicts with the conclusions drawn by Inglehart

Marginal Effect of lag_tradratvalues
on CL+PR
1
2

3

and Welzel (2005).

0

Mean of lag_ln_gdppcppp

6

7

8
lag_ln_gdppcppp

9

10

Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.

Figure 2: Interaction Relation of Traditional vs. Secular values conditioning Economic
Development for Model 6 in Table 4 regarding Freedom House score
Within the tables that include interaction terms, it is still possible to determine whether or
not the control variables have any significant relation to democratic development. Just as in the
tables displayed for the basic modernization models, we see that the only control variable that
has any significance is percentage of fuel exports. Again we see that dependence on fuel exports
is detrimental to the development of democracy within a state, further bearing support for the
“oil curse”.
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Table 5: Coefficients for Regression of Interactive Model on Freedom using Survival vs.
Self-Expression values
Independent
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
-2.2995** -2.4577** -2.2162** -2.1531**
ln
-2.1793** -2.16890**
(.3312406) (.3654719) (.4162132) (.4057658) (.4393472) (.6803234)
GDPpcppp
Survival vs.
SelfExpression

-.7391555 -.6517138
(.5764408) (.5659984)

-.7525789 -.8150022
(.5740711) (.5306772)

-.7092839 -1.227087
(1.253229) (1.151631)

Interactive
GDP/SelfExpression

.0000182
.0000174
(.0000182) (.0000226)

.0000174
.0000191
(.0000231) (.0000217)

.0000366
.0001183
(.0001447) (.0001319)

Former
British
Colony

-.9087711
(.7509945)

Ethnic
Fractional
Alesina

-.5906789
(1.360173)

.5245248
(1.015339)

Fuel Export
% of
Merchandise
Exports

-2.059653
(1.875632)

.0286386*
(.0131301)

Aid Per
Capita

.0426392**
(.0149934)

-.0220152 -.0132958
(.0134988) (.0134447)

R2

0.5694

0.5744

0.5698

0.5851

0.3336

0.3810

F<
Probability

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0014

# of Obs.

967

967

957

891

462

420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
Given the relevance on the study of democratic development, it is not surprising to find a
vast amount of research on this topic. Not only has democracy seemingly become the preferred
form of governance globally, but democratic peace theory has shown that democratic states are
unlikely to enter into wars with each other (Ray 1998, Oneal and Russett 1999). Increasing the
number of democratic states globally would certainly be a worthy goal of any foreign policy if
democracies do not go to war with each other. Thus we find ourselves at the question, what
factors contribute to democratic development?
Modernization theory contends that economic development is the key to developing
levels of democracies. As the average citizen of a state finds themselves having more resources,
they find themselves struggling less just to survive. The additional resources in their lives afford
them more time and opportunities to focus on other things such as what role they play in respect
to society and how they feel the state should protect them. This idea is given credence by the
work of Inglehart and Welzel (2005). This is supported by the results of the models tested in this
thesis, which examine the direct relationship between economic development and democratic
development. In the models used to test the relationship between the two, each show significant
support for this idea.
Additionally, this thesis attempts to rework their findings by testing the effects of
economic development and the role of culture on democratic development in conjunction with
each other. The results of the interactive model found in this thesis, however, show that culture’s
role as an intervening variable on democracy is questionable. Furthermore, the models show that
culture and economic development have negligible conditioning effects on each other.
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5.1 Does Culture Matter?
By adding cultural components to each of the models tested, we find that the inferred
importance of culture does not have a significant effect on democratic development. In fact, we
find a surprising lack of support for this idea. The only significant relation found in all the
models tested was between the effects of self-expression values on civil liberties scores. In these
models, the more that personal values moved way from survival values and towards selfexpression values, the more civil liberties were found in a state.
Because the idea that culture plays a significant role in democratic development is such a
popular concept, it is necessary to speculate on why the results of the models presented in this
paper largely show that culture does not play a significant role. Because the questions posed in
WVS includes commonly used questions regarding interpersonal trust and views on equality, the
composition of WVS data is likely not the cause for the insignificance of culture on democratic
development. When studying the works of Inglehart and Welzel (2003, 2005), one notices that
there is a diverse range in which democratic countries appear. By taking into account both the
findings of this thesis and observing the distribution of states’ values found in Inglehart and
Welzel’s work, one can determine that developing culture to meet a set standard is not what is of
importance. Instead, it is possible that only the growth rates of those values may be where
scholars should direct their focus. To be more precise, it is not the position of the cultural values
of the observed state, but the amount of change in those cultural values.6
It is also possible that focus should now be shifted away from the importance of culture
and onto some other intervening variable. A structural variable may be a more likely avenue to
finding effects on democratic development. For decades scholars have often tied culture to the

6

However, this method could not be used to account for states in a dataset who have already achieved high levels of
democracy and have shown high levels of democracy throughout the time span presented in the data.
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way government and economy are structured in a state, particularly those interested in Latin
American development (Johnson 1959, Lambert 1967). Combining this idea with the results of
the interaction models in this thesis, one can then move on to theorize that culture, in and of
itself, does not have a major causal effect on levels of democracy. However, culture may have
influenced the type of structure that is present within a state, which may affect democratic
development. In this case, culture is not what directly affects the level of democracy found in a
state. Instead, it is the structure that the state’s cultural legacy has left behind. By focusing more
on structural factors, such as whether or not plantations make up the bulk of the agricultural
sector or the effect of the middle class, future scholars will be able to further investigate the link
between economic development and democratic development.
However, the reason for why culture is not a significant variable may be because of the
limited nature of WVS. As stated above, WVS datasets are composed in only a fraction of the
countries throughout the world. Additionally, these datasets only go back as far as the year 1981
and are only released approximately every five years. Due to the nature of survey data, WVS is
very limited in the amount of information it can provide.
5.2 Where to Focus?
Yet, it is important to remember that the models presented in thesis did show a very
specific relationship in which culture was significant. Personal values moving towards selfexpression values did show a greater likelihood that there will be more civil liberties within a
state. This finding may help to focus on scholars works on where culture has a significant effect
on democratic development.
By eliminating culture as an important component of democratic development,
researchers and policy makers can now focus on other avenues of study to further the knowledge
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of democratic development. The importance of these findings will allow future policy makers
with the hopes of spreading democracies globally to create comprehensive policies that focus
attention in the right areas. Continued effort in economic development should be a key
objective, while further understanding of the role structural variables play may help to further
fulfill those goals.
Of the control variables added to the models only one had any significance. This variable
lends support to the idea of the “oil curse” often attributed to states that lack high levels of
democracy. As a whole, we can determine that increased reliance on the sale of oil as a
proportion of a state’s total exports have a detrimental effect on a state’s level of democracy.
The effects of ethnic fractionalization, aid received per capita, or having been a British colony
had no significant effect on democratic development.
What we find in the models presented is that the focus placed on the effects of culture
may be misplaced. The results presented above show that the effects of culture may be more
specific than previously thought. Future research including both culture and democratic
development should then focus on how culture affects the type of civil liberties found in a state.
The results of these models may allow future policy makers to focus their attention.
Those with the hopes of spreading democracies globally will be able to create comprehensive
policies that have a focused strategy to achieve that objective by keeping the outcome of the
models presented here in mind. Continued effort in economic development should remain a key
objective as it is strongly related to democratic development. Focused effort on the culture of a
state should allow for the development of civil liberties in a state. However, further
understanding of the role that structural variables play in democratic development may be
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needed in order to have a more thorough knowledge on how to spread higher levels of
democracies throughout the world.
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Appendix 1
Tables of Coefficients for Regression of both Basic Modernization Model and Interactive
Model
Table 6: Coefficients for Regression of Basic Modernization Model on Political Rights
using Traditional vs. Secular values
Independent
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
ln GDPpcppp

-1.36996**
(.2022276)

-1.40655**
(.1953327)

-1.34270**
(.2164771)

-1.33238**
(.2288219)

-1.36832**
(.3110568)

-1.41861**
(.4227828)

Traditional vs.
Secular

.078687
(.1564097)

.0444717
(.1530122)

.1153199
(.1620127)

.1704532
(.1615395)

.1570509
(.226991)

.2547151
(.2233619)

Former British
Colony

-.4743364
(.46244)

Ethnic
Fractional
Alesina

-.2956429
(.8468581)

.3530021
(.530189)

Fuel Export
% of
Merchandise
Exports

-.8417879
(1.021278)

.0179521*
(.007344)

Aid Per Capita

.025177**
(.008904)

-.0114192
(.0076385)

-.0073725
(.0082495)

R2

0.4946

0.4993

0.4952

0.5081

0.2971

0.3437

F<
Probability

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0001

0.0015

# of Obs.

971

971

961

891

466

420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval.
Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Table 7: Coefficients for Regression of Basic Modernization Model on Civil Liberties using
Traditional vs. Secular values
Independent
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
ln GDPpcppp

-1.37437**
(.1396482)

-1.42107**
(.1390388)

-1.34614**
(.1528299)

-1.38364**
(.162644)

-1.15612**
(.2044194)

-1.25308**
(.280674)

Traditional vs.
Secular

.1005421
(.1276338)

.0568735
(.1243973)

.1379422
(.1281009)

.1586106
(.1279398)

.1421254
(.1766573)

.2033272
(.1756325)

Former British
Colony

-.6053903
(.3072385)

Ethnic
Fractional
Alesina

-.2720854
(.5437758)

.3892352
(.4813751)

Fuel Export
% of
Merchandise
Exports

-.5775531
(.6833172)

.0113699
(.007304)

Aid Per Capita

.0182261*
(.0081794)

-.0090141
(.0060585)

-.0048149
(.0061632)

R2

0.5824

0.5915

0.5846

0.6005

0.3333

0.3857

F<
Probability

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0003

# of Obs.

971

971

961

891

466

420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval.
Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Table 8: Coefficients for Basic Modernization Model on Political Rights using Survival vs.
Self-Expression values
Independent
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
ln GDPpcppp

-1.24563**
(.2048913)

-1.324293**
(.22468)

-1.207152**
(.2545826)

-1.03736**
(.2442166)

-1.272981**
(.2729993)

-1.343005**
(.4681752)

Survival vs.
SelfExpression

-.1129733
(.1555124)

-.0774244
(.1547349)

-.1270845
(.2174602)

-.1803615
(.1528072)

-.1398322
(.2855685)

-.1806797
(.2719016)

Former
British Colony

-.4661192
(.4717035)

Ethnic
Fractional
Alesina

-.3800887
(.8444149)

.2174602
(.555432)

Fuel Export
% of
Merchandise
Exports

-1.16524
(1.133718)

.0713596*
(.0069164)

Aid Per
Capita

.0232634**
(.0086718)

-.0114122
(.0073848)

-.0070156
(.0078054)

R2

0.4952

0.4998

0.4950

0.5056

0.2920

0.3315

F<
Probability

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0002

0.0006

# of Obs.

971

971

961

891

466

420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Table 9: Coefficients for Regression of Interactive Model on Political Rights using
Traditional vs. Secular values and Interactive Term GDP/Secular
Independent
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
ln GDPpcppp -1.352** -1.3870**
-1.3282**
-1.2991**
-1.4132**
-1.4088**
(.19279)
(.1953327) (.2077304) (.2014429) (.3217383) (.3728314)
Traditional
vs. Secular

.1923818
(.31041)

.1419376
(.3108493)

.2178045
(.3121956)

.4785653
(.3217299)

.5699704
(.4219239)

.8741444
(.3918346)

Interactive
GDP/Secular

-9.44 e06
(.00001)

-7.91e-06
(.0000131)

-8.85e-06
(.0000134)

-.0000224
(.0000137)

-.0000641
(.0000378)

-.0000922
(.0000382)

Former
British
Colony

-.431403
(.4635295)

Ethnic
Fractional
Alesina

.0570383
(.8727132)

.3150514
(.5404982)

Fuel Export
% of
Merchandise
Exports

-1.126917
(1.024559)

.020955**
(.0066334)

Aid Per
Capita

.026631**
(.0081941)

-.0106938
(.007365)

-.0059561
(.0078425)

R2

0.4943

0.4982

0.4946

0.5220

0.3161

0.3815

F<
Probability

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0002

0.0000

# of Obs.

967

967

957

891

462

420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval.
Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Table 10: Coefficients for Regression of Interactive Model on Civil Liberties using
Traditional vs. Secular values and Interactive Term GDP/Secular
Independent
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
ln
GDPpcppp

-1.3625**
(.130505)

-1.4088** -1.33754** -1.3602** -1.2012** -1.24508**
(.1294893) (.1444297) (.1442204) (.1960924) (.2270077)

Traditional
vs. Secular

.2179035
(.2370962)

.1512329
.2440376
(.2358226) (.237558)

.375902
.5277718
.7115942
(.2463067) (.3042119) (.2902607)

Interactive
GDP/Secular

-9.32 e-06
(.000010)

-7.30e-06
-8.68e-06
(.0000102) (.000011)

-.0000158 -.0000587 -.0000756
(.0000114) (.0000273) (.0000316)

Former
British
Colony

-.5701726
(.3082372)

Ethnic
Fractional
Alesina

.0173039
(.5325363)

.3556279
(.498144)

Fuel Export
% of
Merchandise
Exports

-.8115131
(.7516744)

.0134877
(.0068506)

Aid Per
Capita

.0194191*
(.0073404)

-.0083359 -.0036528
(.0057879) (.0058264)

R2

0.5835

0.5914

0.5853

0.6086

0.3591

0.4258

F<
Probability

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

# of Obs.

967

967

957

891

462

420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Table 11: Coefficients for Regression of Interactive Model on Political Rights using
Survival vs. Self-Expression values
Independent
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
ln
GDPpcppp

-1.2161** -1.2902** -1.1779** -1.1024** -1.2762** -1.2444**
(.2117695) (.2336248) (.2618478) (.2481793) (.3008158) (.468359)

Survival vs.
SelfExpression

-.3459192
(.340149)

Interactive
GDP/SelfExpression

.0000125
.0000121
.000012
.0000133
-.0000104 .000036
(.0000134) (.0000134) (.0000136) (.0000129) (.0000915) (.0000844)

Former
British
Colony

-.3049417 -.3508653
(.3350101) (.339668)

-.4118486 -.1205565 -.4300658
(.3156984) (.7983642) (.7549539)

-.4258743
(.4782242)

Ethnic
Fractional
Alesina

-.3486344
(.8464831)

.2210582
(.5665118)

Fuel Export
% of
Merchandise
Exports

-1.199987
(1.14032)

.0171837*
(.0070819)

Aid Per
Capita

.0240458**
(.0082529)

-.0116579 -.0073675
(.0078188) (.0081261)

R2

0.4976

0.5015

0.4973

0.5106

0.2939

0.3332

F<
Probability

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0001

0.0010

# of Obs.

967

967

957

891

462

420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.

40

Table 12: Coefficients for Regression of Interactive Model on Civil Liberties using Survival
vs. Self-Expression values
Independent
Variables
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
ln
-1.0834**
-1.1674**
-1.0382**
-1.0507**
-.90307**
-.92443**
GDPpcppp
(.1357961) (.1492348) (.1707651) (.1711204) (.1645428) (.2574793)
Survival vs.
SelfExpression

-.3932363
(.2515759)

-.3467721
(.2479631)

-.4017135
(.2497761)

-.4031536
(.2332945)

-.5887274
(.4824288)

-.7970214
(.4526149)

Interactive
GDP/SelfExpression

5.69e-06
(9.87e-06)

5.24e-06
(9.78e-06)

5.40e-06
(.00001)

5.80e-06
(9.45e-06)

.000047
(.0000562)

.0000823
(.0000527)

Former
British
Colony

-.4828968
(.2975634)

Ethnic
Fractional
Alesina

-.2420445
(.5377174)

.3034665
(.4756507)

Fuel Export
% of
Merchandis
e Exports

-.8596668
(.7834641)

.0114549
(.0063568)

Aid Per
Capita

.0185935
(.0072708)

-.0103573
(.0058583)

-.0059283
(.0056021)

R2

0.5969

0.6027

0.5984

0.6127

0.3429

0.3930

F<
Probability

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0013

# of Obs.

967

967

957

891

462

420

* Indicate confidence at 95% interval, ** Indicate confidence at 99% interval
Robust standard error in parentheses.
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Appendix 2
List of countries included for cultural variables
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia
Brazil
Britain (input as United Kingdom)
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
E. Germany
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Georgia
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran

Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Kyrgyzstan
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Mexico
Moldova
Montenegro
Morocco
Northern Ireland
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
South Africa
South Korea
Saudi Arabia
Serbia
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
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Taiwan
Tanzania
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
Uruguay
United States
Venezuela
Vietnam
W. Germany
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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